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Abstract
In this note, we examine the e¤ects of capital taxation on innovation and economic
growth. We nd that capital taxation has drastically di¤erent e¤ects in the short run
and in the long run. An increase in the capital income tax rate has both a consumption
e¤ect and a tax-shifting e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rates of technology and output.
In the long run, the tax-shifting e¤ect dominates the consumption e¤ect yielding an
overall positive e¤ect of capital taxation on steady-state economic growth. However,
in the short run, the consumption e¤ect becomes the dominant force causing an initial
negative e¤ect of capital taxation on the equilibrium growth rates. These contrasting
e¤ects of capital taxation at di¤erent time horizons may provide a plausible explanation
for the mixed evidence in the empirical literature on capital taxation and economic
growth.
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JEL classi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1 Introduction
In this note, we examine the e¤ects of capital taxation on innovation and economic growth.
In the literature of endogenous growth, one of the major issues is whether capital taxation
stimulates or impedes growth. Earlier studies employing an AK-type endogenous growth
model show that the impact of raising the capital tax rate on long-run economic growth is
negative (Judd, 1985; Chamley, 1986; King and Rebelo, 1990; Rebelo, 1991; Jones et al.,
1993; Pecorino, 1993, 1994; Devereux and Love, 1994; Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini, 1998),
although the quantitative magnitude could be negligibly small (Lucas, 1990; Stokey and
Rebelo, 1995).1 The intuition of this negative growth e¤ect of capital taxation is that a
higher capital tax rate discourages the accumulation of physical capital and is therefore
detrimental to economic growth.
On the empirical side, the results are rather inconclusive. A number of empirical studies
have found that capital taxation, such as corporate prot tax and capital gains tax, can be
harmful to economic growth (see e.g., Lee and Gordon, 2005; Hungerford, 2010; Arnold et al.,
2011; Dahlby and Ferede, 2012), whereas other empirical studies have found a neutral or even
positive e¤ect of capital taxation on growth (see e.g., Mendoza et al., 1997; Angelopoulos et
al., 2007; ten Kate and Milionis, 2015). Therefore, although the abovementioned theoretical
prediction is consistent with some of the empirical studies, it seems to contrast other empirical
ndings in the literature.
While capital accumulation is undoubtedly an important engine of economic growth,
technological progress driven by innovation and R&D also acts as an important driver for
growth; see Aghion and Howitt (2009, p.109) for a discussion on data from OECD countries.2
Recently, R&D-based growth models pioneered by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) have been used to explore the interrelation between capital taxation, innovation and
economic growth; see e.g., Lin and Russo (1999), Zeng and Zhang (2002), Haruyama and
Itaya (2006) and Aghion et al. (2013). This note contributes to the literature by providing
an analysis of both the short-run and long-run e¤ects of capital taxation on innovation and
economic growth within the seminal innovation-driven growth model in Romer (1990), which
is a workhorse model in R&D-based growth theory. In our analysis, we consider di¤erent
tax-shifting schemes. Specically, we examine the growth e¤ects of capital taxation with tax
shifting from lump-sum tax and also labor income tax to capital income tax.
In the case of tax shifting from lump-sum tax to capital income tax, an increase in
1Other than focusing on the long-run growth e¤ect, Frankel (1998) studies the dynamics of capital taxation
during the transition process.
2Aghion and Howitt (2009, p.108) report that TFP growth accounts for about two-thirds of economic
growth in OECD countries, while capital deepening accounts for one third.
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the capital tax rate leads to a decrease in the steady-state equilibrium growth rate via a
consumption e¤ect of capital taxation. Intuitively, a higher capital tax rate causes households
to decrease their saving rate and increase their consumption rate, which in turn leads to an
increase in leisure and a decrease in labor supply. Given that labor is a factor input for
R&D, a smaller labor supply gives rise to a lower growth rate of technology, which in turn
determines the long-run growth rates of output and capital.
In the case of tax shifting from labor income tax to capital income tax, an increase in
the capital tax rate leads to an increase in the steady-state equilibrium growth rate via a
tax-shifting e¤ect of capital taxation. Intuitively, an increase in the capital income tax rate
allows the labor income tax rate to decrease, which in turn leads to a decrease in leisure
and an increase in labor supply. The larger labor supply gives rise to higher growth rates of
technology, output and even capital despite the lower capital-investment rate caused by the
higher capital tax rate. Although the previously mentioned consumption e¤ect of capital
taxation is also present, it is dominated by the tax-shifting e¤ect in the long run. However,
we nd that the relative magnitude of these two e¤ects becomes very di¤erent in the short
run.
We calibrate the model to aggregate data in the US to provide a quantitative analysis
on the dynamic e¤ects of capital taxation on economic growth. We consider the case of
tax shifting from labor income tax to capital income tax and nd that an increase in the
capital tax rate leads to a short-run decrease in the equilibrium growth rates of technology
and output and a gradual convergence to the higher long-run growth rates of technology and
output. The reason for these contrasting short-run and long-run e¤ects is that the consump-
tion e¤ect of capital taxation is relatively strong in the short run. Intuitively, an increase
in the capital income tax rate leads to a decrease in the steady-state equilibrium capital-
technology ratio. Before the economy reaches this new steady-state capital-technology ratio,
households drastically cut down their saving rate below its new steady-state level, which in
turn increases their consumption rate substantially. This substantial increase in consumption
leads to a substantial increase in leisure and a substantial decrease in labor supply, which
in turn reduces temporarily the equilibrium growth rates of technology and output. In the
long run, the e¤ect of a lower wage-income tax rate becomes the dominant force and instead
raises the supply of labor, which in turn increases the steady-state equilibrium growth rates
of technology and output.
Our paper is most closely related to recent studies on taxation and economic growth in
the R&D-based growth model. Zeng and Zhang (2002) show that the long-run growth rate
is independent of labor income tax and consumption tax but decreasing in capital income
tax. In contrast, Lin and Russo (1999) analyze how the taxation of di¤erent sources of
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capital income a¤ects long-run growth and nd that a higher capital income tax rate for
innovative rms could be growth-enhancing if the tax system permits tax credits for R&D
spending. Moreover, by focusing on the stability analysis of equilibria, Haruyama and Itaya
(2006) also show that the growth e¤ect of taxing capital income is positive when the economy
exhibits indeterminacy. Although these two papers nd that capital taxation and economic
growth may exhibit a positive relationship, our paper departs from them in highlighting the
contrasting dynamic e¤ects of capital taxation on economic growth. More recently, Aghion et
al. (2013) and Hong (2014) adopt a quality-ladder R&D-based growth model to investigate
optimal capital taxation. Their primary focus, however, is on the normative analysis with
respect to the Chamley-Judd (Chamley 1986; Judd 1985) result (i.e., the optimal capital
tax is zero), while the present paper focuses on the positive analysis regarding the growth
e¤ect of capital taxation. Furthermore, their analysis does not deal with the case in which
innovation is driven by R&D labor (e.g., scientists and engineers). When R&D uses labor
as the factor input, we nd that the e¤ects of capital taxation are drastically di¤erent at
di¤erent time horizons. This nding may provide a plausible explanation for the mixed
evidence in the empirical literature on capital taxation and economic growth.
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic
model structure. In Section 3, we investigate the growth e¤ects of capital taxation. In
Section 4, we calibrate the model to provide a quantitative analysis of capital taxation.
Finally, some concluding remarks are discussed in Section 5.
2 The model
The model that we consider is an extension of the seminal workhorse R&D-based growth
model from Romer (1990).3 In the Romer model, R&D investment creates new varieties
of intermediate goods. We extend the model by introducing endogenous labor supply and
distortionary income taxes. In what follows, we describe the model structure in turn.
2.1 Household
The economy is inhabited by a representative household. Population is stationary and nor-
malized to unity. The household has one unit of time that can be allocated between leisure
3In the case of extending the model into a scale-invariant semi-endogenous growth model as in Jones
(1995), the long-run growth e¤ect of capital taxation simply becomes a level e¤ect. In other words, instead
of increasing (decreasing) the growth rate of technology, capital taxation increases (decreases) the level of
technology in the long run.
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and production. The representative households lifetime utility is given as:4
U =
Z 1
0
e t[lnC + (1  L)] dt, (1)
where the parameter  > 0 is the households subjective discount rate and the parameter
 > 0 determines the disutility of labor supply. The utility is increasing in consumption C
and decreasing in labor supply L 2 (0; 1).
Two points regarding the utility function in equation (1) should be noted. First, to make
our analysis tractable, the household is specied to have a quasi-linear utility function. In
the quantitative analysis in Section 4, we will consider a more general utility function in
order to examine the robustness of our results. Second, as pointed out by Hansen (1985)
and Rogerson (1988), the linearity in work hours in the utility function can be justied as
capturing indivisible labor.
The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to the budget con-
straint:
_K + _a = ra+ (1  K)rKK + (1  L)wL  C   Z. (2)
The variable K denotes the stock of physical capital. The variable a (= V A) denotes the
value of equity shares of monopolistic rms, in which A is the number of monopolistic rms
and V is the value of each rm. w is the wage rate. r is the real interest rate, whereas
rK is the capital rental rate.5 The rates of return on the two assets, physical capital and
equity shares, must follow a no-arbitrage condition r = (1   K)rK in equilibrium. The
policy instrument Z is a lump-sum tax.6 The other policy instruments fL; Kg < 1 are
respectively the labor and capital income tax rates.7
By solving the households optimization problem, we can easily derive the typical Keynes-
Ramsey rules:
_C
C
= (1  K)rK   , (3)
and also the optimality condition for labor supply, which is in the form of a horizontal labor
supply curve given the quasi-linear utility function in (1):
w = C=(1  L). (4)
4For notational simplicity, we drop the time subscript.
5For simplicity, we assume zero capital depreciation rate.
6We allow for the presence of a lump tax simply to explore the implications of di¤erent tax-shifting
schemes. Our main results focus on the more realistic case of Z = 0.
7In our analysis, we focus on the case in which K > 0; see for example Zeng and Zhang (2007) and Chu
et al. (2016), who examine the e¤ects of subsidy policies in the R&D-based growth model.
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2.2 Final goods
There is a single nal good Y , which is produced by combining labor and a continuum of
intermediate goods, according to the following aggregator:
Y = L1 Y
Z A
0
xi di, (5)
where LY is the labor input in nal goods production, xi for i 2 [0; A] is the intermediate good
of type i, and A is the number of varieties of intermediate goods. The nal good is treated
as the numeraire, and hence in what follows its price is normalized to unity. We assume that
the nal goods sector is perfectly competitive. Prot maximization of the nal goods rms
yields the following conditional demand functions for labor input and intermediate goods:
LY = (1  )Y=w, (6)
xi = LY (=pi)
1
1  , (7)
where pi is the price of xi relative to nal goods.
2.3 Intermediate goods
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolist who owns a perpetually protected
patent for that good. Following Romer (1990), capital is the factor input for producing
intermediate goods, and the technology is simply a linear one-to-one function. That is, the
production function is expressed as xi = ki, where ki is the capital input used by intermediate
rm i. Accordingly, the prot of intermediate goods rm i is:
i = pixi   rKki. (8)
Prot maximization subject to the conditional demand function for intermediate goods rm
i yields the following markup-pricing rule:
pi =
rK

> rK . (9)
Equation (9) implies that the level of price is the same across intermediate goods rms. Based
on equation (7) and the production function xi = ki, we have a symmetric equilibrium among
intermediate rms; i.e., xi = x and ki = k. Then, we can obtain the following prot function
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of intermediate goods rms:
i =  =
(1  )Y
A
. (10)
2.4 R&D
In the R&D sector, the familiar no-arbitrage condition for the value of a variety V is:
rV =  + _V . (11)
Equation (11) states that, for each variety, the rate of return on an invention must be equal
to the sum of the monopolistic prot and capital gain (or loss) . As in Romer (1990), labor
is the factor input of R&D. The innovation function of new varieties is given by:
_A = ALA, (12)
where  > 0 is the R&D productivity parameter and LA denotes R&D labor. Given free
entry into the R&D sector, the zero-prot condition of R&D is
_AV = wLA , AV = w. (13)
2.5 Government
The government collects taxes, including capital income tax, labor income tax, and lump-
sum tax, to nance its public spending. At any instant of time, the government budget
constraint can be expressed as:
KrKK + LwL+ Z = G. (14)
The variable G denotes government spending, which is assumed to be a xed proportion
 2 (0; 1) of nal output such that
G = Y . (15)
2.6 Aggregation
Since the intermediate rms are symmetric, the total amount of capital is K = Aki = Ak.
Given xi = ki, xi = x, ki = k, and K = Ak, the nal output production function in equation
(5) can then be expressed as:
Y = A1 KL1 Y : (16)
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After some calculations using equations (2), (6), (7), (11)-(14), and (16), we can derive the
resource constraint in this economy:
_K = Y   C  G: (17)
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium and the balanced-growth path
The decentralized equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fC;K ;A;Y ;L;LY ;LA; x ;Gg1t=0,
prices fw; r; rK ; pi; V g1t=0, and policies fK ; L;Zg, such that at any instant of time:
a households maximize lifetime utility (1) taking prices and policies as given;
b competitive nal goods rms choose fx; LY g to maximize prot taking prices as given;
c monopolistic intermediate rms i 2 [0; A] choose fki; pig to maximize prot taking rK
as given;
d R&D rms choose LA to maximize prot taking fV;wg as given;
e the market for nal goods clears, i.e., _K = Y   C  G;
f the labor market clears, i.e., L = LA + LY ;
g the government budget constraint is balanced, i.e., KrKK + LwL+ Z = G.
The balanced growth path is characterized by a set of constant growth rates of all eco-
nomic variables. Let  denote the growth rate of technology and a ~over the variable
denote its steady-state value. Along the balanced growth path, we have
_K
K
=
_Y
Y
=
_C
C
=
_w
w
=
_A
A
= ~, _L = _LY = _LA = 0.
3 Long-run growth e¤ects of capital taxation
In this section we examine the growth e¤ects of the capital tax rate. To maintain a con-
stant proportion of government spending, raising the capital tax must be accompanied by a
reduction in another tax. As revealed in equation (14), this can be either a reduction in the
lump-sum tax (if it is available) or a reduction in the labor income tax (if the lump-sum tax
is not available). In the analysis that follows, we deal with each of the two scenarios in turn.
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3.1 Tax shifting from lump-sum tax to capital income tax
Equipped with the denition of the decentralized equilibrium in Section 2.7 and dening
! = w=A, c = C=A and z = Z=A, we can express the steady-state equilibrium conditions as
follows:
~ = (1  K)~rK   ; (18a)
~! = ~c=(1  L); (18b)
~LY = (1  )~x ~L1 Y =~!; (18c)
~x = ~LY (
2=~rK)
1=(1 ); (18d)
~r = ~LY ; (18e)
~r = (1  K)~rK ; (18f)
~ = ~LA; (18g)
~L = ~LY + ~LA; (18h)
~ = (1  )~x 1 ~L1 Y   ~c=~x; (18i)
K~rK ~x+ L~! ~L+ ~z = ~x
 ~L1 Y ; (18j)
in which ten equations are used to solve ten unknowns ~, ~rK , ~LY , ~LA, ~L, ~!, ~c, ~x, ~r and ~z. We
briey discuss how we obtain equations (18). (18a) is derived from the usual Keynes-Ramsey
rule (3). (18b) is derived from the optimality condition for labor supply (4). (18c) and (18d)
are respectively the demand functions for nal-goods labor and intermediate goods, (6) and
(7). (18e) is derived from inserting _V = 0 into the no-arbitrage condition in the R&D sector
(11), and by using (6), (10) and (13). (18f) is the no-arbitrage condition of asset. (18g) is
derived from the innovation function of varieties (12). (18h) is the labor-market clearing
condition. (18i) is derived from dividing both sides of the resource constraint (17) by A and
using the condition Ax = K. (18j) is derived from dividing both sides of the government
constraint (14) by A and using the condition G = Y .
We rst use (18a), (18e), (18f)-(18h) to eliminate f~r; ~; ~rKg and express f~LY ; ~LAg as
functions of ~L given by
~LY =
~L+ =
1 + 
,
~LA =
~L  =
1 + 
.
These two equations indicate a positive relationship between f~LA; ~LY g and ~L. Moreover,
from the previous condition for ~LA, we can derive the condition ~ = (~L   )=(1 + ),
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which shows that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technology is increasing in ~L.
Thus, we have
sgn

@~
@K

= sgn
 
@ ~LA
@K
!
= sgn
 
@ ~L
@K
!
. (19)
Accordingly, to investigate the growth e¤ect of the capital tax rate, it is convenient to draw
an inference from examining the e¤ect of the capital tax rate on labor ~L.
We now derive an equilibrium expression of labor ~L. By using (8) and (9), we have
 = ( 1

  1)~rKK=A. This expression together with (10) implies that rKK = 2Y . Then,
dividing both sides of (17) by Y yields
~
K
Y
= 1     C
Y
.
By inserting C=Y = (1 L)(1 )=(~LY ), which is derived from (4) and (6), and rKK = 2Y
into the above equation and using (18e), (18f) and (18g) along with the conditions for ~LY
and ~LA, we can obtain the following equation with one unknown ~L:
1  (1 + )
(~L+ =)

2(1  K) = 1     (1  L)(1  )(1 + )
(~L+ =)
.
Simplifying this equation yields
~L =
1
1  (K)

1  L

  (1  K)
(1  )



  

, (20)
where (K)  ( 2K)=(1 2) is a composite parameter and L is an exogenous policy
parameter. Then, from equation (20), we can obtain the following relationship:
@ ~L
@K
=   
2
(1  2)[1  (K)]2

1  L

  (1  K)
(1  )


  [1  (K)]1 + 




,
which can be further simplied to8
@ ~L
@K
=  [(1 + )
~LA + 2=]
(1  2)[1  (K)] < 0. (21)
From (19) and (21), we have established the following proposition:
8The following reasoning ensures that 1 (K) = [1     2(1  K)]=(1  2) > 0. The steady-state
consumption-output ratio is C=Y = 1     2(1  K) + 2(1  K)=(e + ). Therefore, lim!0 C=Y =
1     2(1  K). In other words, one can restrict 1  (K) > 0 by appealing to the fact that C=Y > 0
for all values of .
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Proposition 1 In the case of tax shifting from lump-sum tax to capital income tax, raising
the capital income tax rate reduces the steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
Equation (19) is the key to understanding Proposition 1. It essentially says that the
e¤ect of the capital tax rate on long-run growth hinges on its e¤ect on labor ~L. When the
capital tax rate is higher, households tend to reduce their investment rate and increase their
consumption rate. The increase in consumption raises leisure and reduces labor supply (by
shifting up the horizontal labor supply curve). Therefore, a higher capital tax rate reduces
the equilibrium levels of labor input, R&D labor and economic growth.
3.2 Tax shifting from labor income tax to capital income tax
A lump-sum tax is not a realistic description in most economies. In this subsection, we
therefore set aside the possibility of a lump-sum tax and deal with the more realistic case
in which a rise in the capital tax rate is coupled with a reduction in another distortionary
tax. This kind of tax shifting has been extensively investigated in the literature on factor
taxation; see e.g., Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Niepelt (2004), Aghion et al. (2013) and
Chen and Lu (2013). Under such a situation we drop ~z from the model in this subsection.
Thus, equation (18j) is rewritten as:
K~rK ~x+ ~L~! ~L = ~x
 ~L1 Y . (22)
It is useful to note that in (22) the labor income tax rate ~L becomes an endogenous variable
because it needs to adjust in response to a change in the capital tax rate.
The macroeconomy is now described by (18a)-(18i) and (22) from which we solve for ten
unknowns ~, ~rK , ~LY , ~LA, ~L, ~!, ~c, ~x, ~r and ~L. By arranging (22) with (6), (16), (18c) and
the condition rKK = 2Y , we can obtain
~L =
(   2K)
1  
~LY
~L
=

1 +

~L

(K),
where the second equality uses ~LY = (~L+=)=(1+). Using the above condition and (20),
we can solve the two unknowns f~L; ~Lg and obtain the following quadratic equation:


~L2  



  1  (1  K)
(1  )[1  (K)]

~L+
(K)
[1  (K)] = 0.
This quadratic equation has two solutions, denoted as ~L1 and ~L2, which are given by:
10
~L1 =
B(K) +
p
B(K)2   4(K)=f[1  (K)]g
2=
, (23a)
~L2 =
B(K) 
p
B(K)2   4(K)=f[1  (K)]g
2=
, (23b)
where B(K)  =()  1  (1  K)=f(1  )[1  (K)]g is a composite parameter.9
To ensure that ~L is positive, we assume that the set of parameters jointly satises the
condition B >
p
4=[(1  )]. Moreover, we restrict our analysis to the case where an
increase in the capital tax rate is coupled with a decrease in the labor tax rate. By doing
so, we can show that ~L1 is the only possible solution to this system.10 From (23a), we can
derive the relationship:
@ ~L1
@K
=

2
(
@B
@K
+
B@B=@K + 2
2=[(1  2)(1  )2]p
B2   4=[(1  )]
)
> 0 (24)
where @B=@K =  [1   + 2(1  K)=(1  2)] =f(1   )(1   )2g > 0. The result in
equation (24) leads us to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In the case of tax shifting from labor income tax to capital income tax,
raising the capital income tax rate increases the steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
It would not be di¢ cult to understand the intuition underlying the positive growth e¤ect
given that we have already shown the importance of equilibrium labor input on economic
growth from previous discussion. In the present case, there are two conicting e¤ects on
labor supply. The rst is the consumption e¤ect that we discussed in Proposition 1; i.e.,
raising the capital tax rate induces the households to lower the investment rate and increase
the consumption rate, which in turn reduces labor supply. The second e¤ect emerges from
the channel of shifting taxes from labor income to capital income. A rise in the capital
income tax rate leads to a reduction in the labor income tax rate, which tends to boost labor
supply. In particular, this latter tax-shifting e¤ect has a more powerful direct impact on the
labor market so that it dominates the former one. As a result, the net e¤ect is positive such
that a higher capital income tax rate stimulates economic growth in the long run.
9For notational simplicity, we suppress the argument of (K) and B(K) in the following equations.
10Based on the denition of tax shifting, an increase in one tax rate should be coupled with a fall in
another tax rate. In Appendix A, we will show that when L = ~L2, to hold a constant proportion of the
government spending, the labor tax rate actually increases in response to an increase in the capital tax rate.
In this paper, we rule out this unrealistic case and only focus on the solution L = ~L1.
11
4 Quantitative analysis
To examine the robustness of our results, we generalize the utility function as follows:
U =
Z 1
0

lnC + 
(1  L)1 
1  

e tdt; (25)
where   0 determines the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Equation (25) nests equation
(1) as a special case when  = 0. The model features 7 parameters: f; ; ; ; ; ; Kg.
We consider the following standard parameter values or empirical moments in the literature.
First, we set the discount rate to  = 0:04 and the capital share to  = 0:30. Second, we
set  = 1:67, which implies a Frisch elasticity of 1.2; see Chetty et al. (2011). Third, in
line with Belo et al. (2013), the government spending ratio is set to  = 0:20. Fourth,
to obtain a leisure time of two-thirds (i.e., L = 1=3), we set = 1:17. Fifth, to generate a
steady-state output growth rate of 1.92%, which is the per capita long-run growth rate of
the US economy, we set = 0:65. Finally, the benchmark value of the capital tax rate is set
to K = 0:36; see for example Lucas (1990). The parameter values are summarized below.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
      K
0:04 1:17 1:67 0:30 0:65 0:20 0:36
Figure 1 presents the growth e¤ects of varying the capital income tax rate from 0 to 0.6.
We can clearly see that, as the capital tax rate increases, the steady-state equilibrium growth
rate increases. From this illustrative numerical exercise, we nd that if the government raises
the capital tax rate from the benchmark value of 36% to a hypothetical value of 50%, the
steady-state equilibrium growth rate increases from 1.92% to 2.02%. The intuition can be
explained as follows. Although an increase in the capital tax rate exerts a negative e¤ect on
economic growth by depressing capital accumulation, it also causes a fall in the labor income
tax rate, which boosts labor supply and thus is benecial to R&D and economic growth. In
the long run, the latter e¤ect dominates. Consequently, the steady-state equilibrium growth
rate increases in response to a rise in the capital income tax rate.
In the rest of this section, we simulate the transition dynamics of an increase in the
capital income tax rate. The dynamic system is presented in Appendix B. We consider the
case of an increase in the capital income tax rate by one percentage point (i.e., from 36% to
37%).11 First of all, the higher rate of capital taxation leads to a decrease in the investment
11In the case of a larger increase in the capital income tax rate, the qualitative pattern of the transitional
paths of variables remains the same. Results are available upon request.
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Figure 1: Long-run growth e¤ect of capital taxation
rate and an increase in the consumption rate as shown in Figures 2 and 3, where investment
I = _K.
Figure 2: Transition path of the investment rate
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Figure 3: Transition path of the consumption rate
The lower capital-investment rate gives rise to an initial fall in the capital growth rate as
shown in Figure 4, which contributes to an initial fall in the output growth rate as we will
show later. The rise in the consumption rate increases leisure and decreases labor supply
as shown in Figure 5. This decrease in labor supply reduces the amount of factor input
available for R&D. As a result, the growth rate of technology also decreases initially as
shown in Figure 6.
Figure 4: Transition path of the capital growth rate
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Figure 5: Transition path of labor supply
Figure 6: Transition path of the technology growth rate
Although tax shifting resulting from a higher capital income tax rate gives rise to a
lower labor income tax rate, this e¤ect is weak in the short run. However, it becomes a
stronger force in the long run as shown in Figure 7. As a result, labor supply eventually
rises above the original level, which in turn leads to a higher steady-state equilibrium growth
rate of technology. Therefore, the initial drop in the growth rates of output and capital is
followed by a subsequent increase. In the long run, the steady-state equilibrium growth rate
of output is higher than the initial steady-state equilibrium growth rate as shown in Figure 8.
To sum up, the reason for the contrasting short-run and long-run e¤ects of capital taxation
15
on economic growth is that the consumption e¤ect is stronger (weaker) than the tax-shifting
e¤ect in the short (long) run.
Figure 7: Transition path of the labor tax rate
Figure 8: Transition path of the output growth rate
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5 Conclusion
In this note, we have explored the short-run and long-run e¤ects of capital taxation on inno-
vation and economic growth. Our results can be summarized as follows. An increase in the
capital income tax rate has both a positive tax-shifting e¤ect and a negative consumption
e¤ect on innovation and economic growth. In the long run, increasing the capital tax rate has
an unambiguously positive e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate because the pos-
itive tax-shifting e¤ect strictly dominates the negative consumption e¤ect. However, along
the transitional path, increasing the capital tax rate rst decreases the equilibrium growth
rates of technology and output before these growth rates converge to a higher steady-state
equilibrium level. These contrasting implications of capital taxation on economic growth
suggest that a complete empirical analysis of capital taxation and economic growth needs
to take into consideration the possibility that the e¤ects of capital taxation change sign at
di¤erent time horizons.
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Appendix A
The system has ten equations, (18a)-(18i), and (22). After some calculations, we can derive
the following expressions for ~L and ~L:


~L2  



  1  (1  K)
(1  )(1  )

~L+

(1  ) = 0; (A1)
~L = [1 + =(~L)]; (A2)
where   (   2K)=(1  2). Equation (A1) gives the two solutions for ~L:
~L1 =


B +
p
B2   4=[(1  )]

2
; (A3)
~L2 =


B  pB2   4=[(1  )]
2
; (A4)
where B  =()  1  (1  K)=[(1  )(1  )].
As mentioned in the main text, our analysis focuses on the case where the notion of tax
shifting is sustained. That is, we impose the condition @~L=@K < 0. We can then show
that the condition @~L=@K < 0 does not hold if L = ~L2.
By plugging ~L2 into (A2) and di¤erentiating it with respect to K yields:
@~L
@K

L=~L2
=

(1   + (1  =))
1  2 +
@
@K

=2: (A5)
where  pB2   4=[(1  )] and
@
@K
=
1


B
@B
@K
+
22
(1  2)(1  )2

> 0; (A6)
where @B=@K > 0. It is clear from equation (A5) that @~L=@K jL=~L2 is positive, which
contradicts the assumption of tax shifting. Therefore, we should rule out the possibility
~L = ~L2.
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Appendix B (not for publication)
This appendix solves the dynamic system of the model under tax shifting from labor income
taxes to capital income taxes (Z = 0 ). The set of equations under the model is expressed
by:
1=C =  (B1)
(1  L)  = (1  L)w (B2)
r = (1  K)rK (B3)
_C=C = (1  K)rK    (B4)
wLY = (1  )Y (B5)
x = LY (
2=rK)
1=(1 ) (B6)
rKK = 
2Y (B7)
A = (1  )Y (B8)
r =

V
+
_V
V
(B9)
G = Y (B10)
Y = KrKK + LwL (B11)
Y = K(ALY )
1  (B12)
_K = Y   C  G (B13)
_A = ALA (B14)
V =
w
A
(B15)
L = LY + LA (B16)
in which 16 equations are used to solve 16 unknowns endogenous variables fC; L; A; K; LY ;
x; rK ; ; r; G; L; Y; ; LA; V; wg; where  denotes the Hamiltonian multiplier. Based on
K = Ax, (B1), (B2), (B5) and (B12) and let f = C=K be the ratio between consumption
and capital, we can obtain:
L = 1  [(1=(f))(1  L)(1  )(1=LY )(LY =x)1 ] 1=: (B17)
Based on (B5), (B7) and (B11), we have:
L =
   2K
1   (
LY
L
): (B18)
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We now turn to deal with the transitional dynamics of the model. By using x = K=A;
(B16), (B17) and (B18), we can infer the following expression:
L = L(x; f; LY ; K); (B19)
where
@L
@x
=
(1  )
x(  
1 L +
L
(1 L)L)
; (B20a)
@L
@f
=
1
f(  
1 L +
L
(1 L)L)
; (B20b)
@L
@LY
=
( 
2K
1 
LY
L
)=(1  L) + 
LY (  1 L + L(1 L)L)
; (B20c)
@L
@K
=
(2LY
L
)=((1  )(1  L))
(  
1 L +
L
(1 L)L)
: (B20d)
Based on (B14) and (B15), we have:
_V
V
=
_w
w
 
_A
A
: (B20e)
From K = Ax, (B5) and (B12), we can further obtain:
_w=w = _A=A   _LY =LY +  _x=x: (B20f)
Additionally, substituting (B20f) into (B20e) yields:
_V
V
= ( _x=x  _LY =LY ): (B20g)
Combining (B3), (B5), (B7), (B8), (B9), (B12) and (B15), we can obtain:
(1  K)2(LY
x
)1  = LY +
_V
V
: (B21a)
Substituting (20g) into (B21a), (B21a) can be rearranged as:
_LY =LY = LY + _x=x  (1  K)(LY
x
)1 : (B21b)
Based on x = K=A, we have the result:
_x=x = _K=K   _A=A: (B21c)
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Substituting f = C=K, (B10), (B13), (B14) and (B16) into (B21c), we have:
_x=x = (1  )(LY
x
)1    f   (L  LY ): (B21d)
From (B21b) and (B21d), we can obtain:
_LY =LY = (1     (1  K))(LY
x
)1    f   (L  2LY ): (B21e)
Moreover, from (B3), (B4), (B5), (B7) and (B12) we can obtain:
_C=C = (1  K)2(LY
x
)1    : (22a)
Based on f = C=K, we have the following expression:
_f=f = _C=C   _K=K: (B22b)
Substituting (B10), (B12) (B13) and (B22a) into (B22b), we can derive:
_f=f = ((1  K)2   (1  ))(LY
x
)1    + f: (B22c)
Based on (B19), (B21d), (B21e), and (B22c), the dynamic system can be expressed as:
_x=x = (1  )(LY
x
)1    f   (L(x; f; LY ; K)  LY ); (B23a)
_f=f = ((1  K)2   (1  ))(LY
x
)1    + f; (B23b)
_LY =LY = (1     (1  K))(LY
x
)1    f   (L(x; f; LY ; K)  2LY ): (B23c)
Linearizing (B23a), (B23b) and (B23c) around the steady-state equilibrium yields:0B@ _x_f
_LY
1CA =
0B@ b11 b12 b13b21 b22 b23
b31 b32 b33
1CA
0B@ x  ~xf   ~f
LY   ~LY
1CA+
0B@ b14b24
b34
1CA dK , (B24)
where
b11 =  (1  )(1  )(LYx )1    x@L(x;f;LY ;K)@x ;
b12 = x( 1  (@L(x;f;LY ;K)@f ));
b13 = (1  )(1  )(LYx )    x(@L(x;f;LY ;K)@LY   1);
b14 =  (@L(x;f;LY ;K)@K );
b21 =  (1  )((1  K)2   (1  ))(LYx )1 (fx);
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b22 = f;
b23 = (1  )((1  K)2   (1  ))(LYx ) (fx);
b24 =  2(LYx )1 f;
b31 =  (1  )(1     (1  K))(LYx )2    @L(x;f;LY ;K)@x LY ;
b32 =  LY   @L(x;f;LY ;K)@f LY ;
b33 = (1  )(1     (1  K))(LYx )1    (@L(x;f;LY ;K)@LY LY   2LY );
b34 = LY (
LY
x
)1    (@L(x;f;LY ;K)
@K
LY ):
Let `1, `2 and `3 be the three characteristic roots of the dynamic system. We do not
analytically prove the saddle-path stability of the dynamic system; instead, we show that
the dynamic system features two positive and one negative characteristic roots numerically.
For expository convenience, in what follows let `1 be the negative root and `2, and `3 be the
positive roots. From (B24), the general solutions for xt; ft and LY;t, can be described by:
xt = ~x+D1e
`1t +D2e
`2t +D3e
`3t; (B25a)
ft = ~f + h1D1e
`1t + h2D2e
`2t + h3D3e
`3t; (B25b)
LY;t = ~LY +
`1   b11   b12h1
b13
D1e
`1t +
`2   b11   b12h2
b13
D2e
`2t +
`3   b11   b12h3
b13
D3e
`3t:
(B25c)
where h1 = [(`1   b33)(`1   b11)  b31b13]=[b32b13 + b12(`1   b33)]; h2 = [(`2   b33)(`2   b11) 
b31b13]=[b32b13 + b12(`2   b33)]; h3 = [(`3   b33)(`3   b11)  b31b13]=[b32b13 + b12(`3   b33)], and
D1; D2 and D3 are undetermined coe¢ cients.
The government changes the capital tax rate K from K0 to K1 at t=0, based on
(B25a)-(B25c), we employ the following equations to capture the dynamic adjustment of xt,
ft, and LY;t:
xt =
(
~x(K0);
~x(K1) +D1e
`1t +D2e
`2t +D3e
`3t;
t = 0 
t  0+ (B26a)
ft =
(
~f(K0);
~f(K1) + h1D1e
`1t + h2D2e
`2t + h3D3e
`3t;
t = 0 
t  0+ (B26b)
LY;t =
(
~LY (K0);
~LY (K1) +
`1 b11 b12h1
b13
D1e
`1t + `2 b11 b12h2
b13
D2e
`2t + `3 b11 b12h3
b13
D3e
`3t;
t = 0 
t  0+
(B26c)
where 0  and 0+ denote the instant before and after the policy implementation, respectively.
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The values for D1; D2; and D3 are determined by:
x0  = x0+ ; (B27a)
D2 = D3 = 0: (B27b)
Equation (B27a) indicates that the level of intermediate goods remains unchanged at
the instant of the policy implementation. Equation (B27b) is the stability condition which
ensures that all xt, ft, and LY;t converge to their new steady-state equilibrium. By using
(B27a) and (B27b), we can obtain:
D1 = ~x(K0)  ~x(K1): (B28)
Inserting (B27b) and (B28) into (B26a)-(B26c) yields:
xt =
(
~x(K0);
~x(K1) + (~x(K0)  ~x(K1))e`1t;
t = 0 
t  0+ (B29a)
ft =
(
~f(K0);
~f(K1) + h1(~x(K0)  ~x(K1))e`1t;
t = 0 
t  0+ (B29b)
LY;t =
(
~LY (K0);
~LY (K1) +
`1 b11 b12h1
b13
(~x(K0)  ~x(K1))e`1t;
t = 0 
t  0+ (B29c)
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